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Abstract:
The model developed in this paper attempts to provide an explanation of the fact that Icelandic
vessel owners and Icelandic skippers do not share costs of operation of a vessel.  In the model
a skipper is contracted to take a fishing vessel to the fishing ground.  The skipper is
remunerated with a share of the catch, subject to an agreed minimum.  Skippers and vessel
owners are modelled as if risk neutral.  Skippers develop a fishing strategy which is more
costly, the higher the value of the potential catch associated with that strategy.  Costs that
accrue are partly pecuniary (and shareable) and partly skipper-specific (and non-shareable).
The conclusions of the paper demonstrate that given the assumptions of our model, a vessel
owner should prefer a remuneration contract with a positive revenue share and zero cost share. 
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1 Introduction
Icelandic vessel owners and Icelandic skippers do not share the costs of operating of a
vessel.  This is in spite of the fact that they share the revenues from its operation, and the fact
that skippers and vessel owners operating in neighboring regions of the North Atlantic do share
costs, at least to some extent.  Hence, it may seem at first glance that the Icelandic vessel
owners offer an inefficient remuneration contract for their crews.
The model developed in this paper attempts to provide a partial explanation of the
phenomena of zero cost share in Icelandic fisheries.  In the model a skipper is contracted to take
a vessel to the fishing ground and remunerated with a share of the catch, subject to an
exogenous base (minimum) wage.  Skippers and vessel owners are modelled as if risk neutral.
Skippers develop a fishing strategy, which is more costly, the higher the value of potential
catch associated with that strategy.  Costs that accrue are partly pecuniary (and shareable) and
partly skipper-specific (and non-shareable).  The conclusions of the paper demonstrate that a
vessel owner should in fact choose a remuneration contract with a positive revenue share and
zero cost share. The structure of the model and the organization of the proof is inspired by the
model presented in Basu (1992).
The model presented in this paper differs in certain respects from Basu’s model.  Basu
analyses an absentee landowner’s choice of remuneration contract with a tenant.  In Basu’s
model costs are (implicitly) assumed to be unrelated to strategies2 chosen by tenants.  In the
present model costs are influenced by a skipper’s choice of strategy.  Furthermore, Basu
argues that institutions offering possibilities for cost sharing are hard to establish in the
agricultural setting, as landowners cannot observe if seed or fertilizers are resold once bought
and brought to the farm.  This problem does not exist on a fishing vessel, as indicated by the
very existence of cost sharing in some fisheries.
The paper is organized as follows:  In the first section a brief overview is given of cost
sharing in the fisheries as it is practiced.  In the next section the existing literature on cost
2In Basu’s terminology strategies are “projects”.2
sharing in fisheries is surveyed.  Thirdly, the basic production relationship for fishing utilized
in the paper is introduced.  Skipper strategies are defined and discussed and interactions
between skippers and owners are accounted for.  The last section of the paper outlines its
conclusions.
2 International evidence on cost sharing in fisheries
The International Labour Office (ILO) published in 1952 a survey on systems of
fishermen’s remuneration based on data available for 1947-1949.  When reviewing the
evidence, Zoeteweij (1957) concludes that “... fishermen’s earnings depend (in most cases)
wholly or largely on the value of the catch ...”.  Zoeteweij refers to this as an extreme form of
profit and loss sharing.
Zoeteweij points out that in some cases the income of fishermen is determined by the
size of the catch, but more often by its value.  The distribution of operating costs varied widely
in the late forties, according to Zoeteweij.  Sometimes the cost of fuel, ice, water, food, lost
gear and selling of catch are distributed in the same manner as income.  Sometimes vessel-
owners and crew have agreed on rules which differ from the income distribution rule.
Sometimes vessel-owners foot the bill for these items entirely, sometimes the bill is the crew’s
responsibility.
A comprehensive survey of the form of remuneration in fisheries, similar to that of the
ILO survey mentioned above, has not been conducted at a more recent date.  But there is no
indication that the importance of sharing has diminished through the years.  Unfortunately, it is
also impossible to judge if the form of sharing has changed since the late forties.
In a personal communication, James E Kirkley of Virginia Institute of Marine Science,
has indicated that the lay or share systems of the Northwest Atlantic fisheries in the US vary
considerably.  Costs are shared, and vessel-owner income guaranteed to some extent in the3
offshore fishery, while costs are not shared and crew income guaranteed in the menhaden
fishery.3
Crew remuneration on Norwegian vessels is regulated by collective bargaining.
According to Bergland (1995) a distinction should be made between the Norwegian inshore
and offshore fleet.  The inshore fleet consists of smaller vessels than the offshore fleet, which
includes the entire trawler fleet and big long-line and gill-net vessels.  The vessels of the
3One system is the so-called 60/40 split used in the offshore fisheries from Maine as far
south as North Carolina.  Kirkley explains that according to this system owners receive 40% of
the gross dockside value of catch and are responsible for capital investment loans and interest,
most dockside repairs, basic hull insurance, accounting fees and certain legal fees.  The crew
receives 60% of the catch value and are responsible for costs for fuel, food, ice, crew
insurance, and other supplies related to  the individual trip.  Crew members are responsible for
their personal supplies and pay for landing costs.  The crew also pays fixed fees out of their
share (for example, $300 for electronics).  Skipper’s bonus, engineer’s fee etc. are paid from
the crew’s share.  One variant of this system is the 60/40 split with owner guarantee share.  In
that case the owner is guaranteed at least $10,000 per trip.  A 50/50 net split also exists,
Kirkley reports.  Under that rule the crew receive 50% of gross receipts net of fuel and
skipper’s bonus.  Skipper and crew are responsible for electronics, ice, insurance, engineer’s
and mate’s fees, and miscellaneous supplies.  The owner remains responsible for all fixed costs
and mortgage.  As for the inshore/offshore corporate menhaden  fishery, Kirkley reports that
there is a lay system plus a minimum guaranteed level of earnings.  Each crew member is
guaranteed $750 per 5-day week.  If net proceeds exceed this level per individual the crew
receives 1% of the gross while the skipper receives 3% of the gross.  In the strictly inshore
fishery (hard crab) a similar rule is in use.  For other fisheries, Kirkley reports, the crew are
paid a share of the total catch, while the captain receives a bonus which is usually 3-7% of the
total landed value of catch.4
inshore fleet are as a rule owned partly or wholly by the skipper.  Some of the crew members
may also be partial owners.  Sharing of proceeds net of operating costs is the general rule in the
inshore fishery.4  The skipper or captain on a trawler (or other type of vessel) participating in
the off shore fishery is not, as a rule, an owner or partial owner of the vessel he operates.
Remuneration consists of a share of operational profits and a fixed wage component.
According to Bergland, op. cit., remuneration by fixed wage has not been in use in the
Norwegian fishing fleet since the end of World War II.
Remuneration of fishing vessel crews in Iceland is, and has for decades been, regulated
by collective bargaining.  The standard remuneration contract on the Icelandic fishing fleet
consists of a revenue share and guaranteed minimum wage.  The share varies considerably
depending upon the fishery and size/type of vessel.  The share size depends on the number of
crew members on a given vessel.  Lastly, the share depends on the world market price of fuel.
If fuel prices are high the share is reduced according to a formula contained in the collective
bargaining contract.5  Conversely, if fuel prices are low the crew’s share is increased.
Dockside prices were regulated by a semi-governmental price board, but that system has been
practically replaced with the advent of fish auction markets.  When fishing vessels are owned
by the same interests as freezing plants which purchase their catch, the wage settlement
contains instructions as to how price disputes should be handled.  Historically forms of
remuneration other than revenue sharing have been used including a flat wage (supplemented
4Cost categories that are shareable are listed in the agreement between the Vessel
Owners’ Union and the Fishermen’ Union, see Bergland and Moe (1988).
5The formula is up for renegotiation every time the contract is renewed and has been
changed several times.5
by a “premium” in the case of good catch)6 and revenue and cost sharing (on some of the
vessels participating in herring fisheries in the 1950s and 1960s).  Hence, revenue sharing
supplemented with a guaranteed minimum wage is the present form of crew-remuneration in
Icelandic fisheries.7
Azabou, Bouzaiane and Nugent (1989) report that in Tunisia sharing is “ ...universally
on a ‘share of the net’ basis.”  According to Azabou et.al. a list of approved deductions from
the gross value of sales was codified by the Algerian Ministry of Agriculture in 1987.  Before
that such a list was standard practice.  The list includes cost of fuel, lubricants, ice, repairs of
tools, nets and ropes as well as selling costs, fixed wage costs of land-based workers, cost of
food for the crew,  social security contributions and part of the cost of repair of the motor on
smaller vessels.
6 In 1996 only one trawler used this form of remuneration.
7Until 1986 the guaranteed minimum wage was paid by a special fund financed by a
levy on exported fish products.  Hence, the cost of minimum wage insurance was internal to
the industry but external to each decision-making unit.  A multitude of funds similar to the
minimum-wage-guarantee-fund were in use, financing everything from basic hull insurance to
the fuel bill.  In 1986 an all-encompassing reform was implemented, eliminating all such funds
and restructuring the share ratio  as to leave the crew income at the same level as before the
reform.  In other words, the intention was that vessel owners should accrue funds in their own
companies to meet the obligations that the collectively financed funds had previously covered.
One should also bear in mind that the rate of exchange of the Icelandic currency (the krona) was
steered so as to secure a given level of profits in the fishing sector.  The declared motive of the
reform was to reduce unnecessary transactions (shuffling the same money back and forth is not
only unnecessary but also costly) and to make the system simpler and easier to comprehend.6
Platteau and Nugent (1991) study sharing in fisheries in lesser-developed countries.
They report a study by Amarasinghe (1988) who finds that crew on a new type of 3.5 ton
vessels used in south Sri Lanka share costs of crew allowances, fuel and market commissions
but not repair expenditure.  On the other hand, repair expenditure is shared on the less
sophisticated inshore fishing vessels that use bible nets and also on traditional craft that
participate in deep-sea fishing.  This exclusion of repair costs from the categories of costs that
are shared is also found in developed countries, according to Platteau and Nugent.  They refer
to White (1977) who finds that repair costs were shared on simple fishing craft used in the
shrimp fishery in the Gulf of Mexico but not on modern vessels.
Davidse et.al. (1993) account in general terms the rules of remuneration used in four
EC countries.  The remuneration systems all have different names in the various countries, but
in all the countries some variation of the operational-profit-sharing system is in use.  In
England and Scotland costs that were defined as non-trip related have been redefined in recent
years in order to increase the profitability in the fishery.
Pure revenue sharing exists in Scotland and England, where it is in use on big vessels.
Pure revenue sharing also exists in a part of the Dutch fleet and for the small vessels in
Denmark.
Table 1: Rules of remuneration of fishing vessel crews, a partial review
Source Area/Vessel type
Accruing to, or paid by crews
Crew income, revenue
share or fixed wage
Cost share,
trip-related
Cost share,
non-trip-
related
J.E. Kirkley,
pers. comm.
1996
Maine/NC USA Revenue share, 60%
Crew pays all
trip related
costs
Non-trip
related costs
not shared
J.E.Kirkley Menhaden
fishery USA
Mixed rule:  $750 +
Max[0 ;
0.01*NetProceeds]
Costs are not
shared
Non-trip
related costs
not shared7
Table 1: Rules of remuneration of fishing vessel crews, a partial review
Source Area/Vessel type
Accruing to, or paid by crews
Crew income, revenue
share or fixed wage
Cost share,
trip-related
Cost share,
non-trip-
related
Bergland (1995) Inshore fleet,
Norway
Revenue share that
depends on fishery
and vessel type
Same as
revenue share
covering
most
operation
cost
categories
Non-trip
related costs
not shared
Bergland (1995) Offshore fleet,
Norway
Fixed wage plus
revenue share
Same as
revenue on
few cost
categories
Non-trip
related costs
not shared
Hansdóttir,
Author’s own
inquiry (1996)
Iceland
Revenue share varies,
guaranteed minimum
income
Costs are not
shared
Non-trip
related costs
not shared
Azabou, et.al.
(1989) Tunisia Variable revenue share Same as
revenue share
Non-trip
related costs
not shared
Amarasinghe
(1988)
Sri Lanka,
traditional fleet Variable revenue share Same as
revenue share
Repair costs,
same as
revenue share
Amarasinghe Sri Lanka,
“new” fleet Variable revenue share Same as
revenue share
Non-trip
related costs
not shared
White (1977)
USA, shrimp,
Gulf of Mexico,
simple crafts
Variable revenue share Same as
revenue share
Repair costs,
same as
revenue share
White USA, shrimp,
Gulf of Mexico,
“modern” craft
Variable revenue share Same as
revenue share
Non-trip
related costs
not shared
Davidse et.al.
(1993),
Vestergaard,
personal
communication
Denmark,
industrial fishery
Revenue share,
30%–50%
Same as
revenue
share,
30%–50%
Non-trip
related costs
not shared
Davidse et.al.
Vestergaard,
personal
communication
Denmark,
Smaller vessels
Revenue share equal
to 50% and a base
wage
Costs are not
shared
Non-trip
related costs
not shared8
Table 1: Rules of remuneration of fishing vessel crews, a partial review
Source Area/Vessel type
Accruing to, or paid by crews
Crew income, revenue
share or fixed wage
Cost share,
trip-related
Cost share,
non-trip-
related
Davidse et.al.,
Guillotreau,
Daures, personal
communication
France, artisanal
and semi
industrial
vessels
Revenue share
45%–55%
Same as
revenue
share,
45%–55%
Non-trip
related costs
not shared
Guillotreau,
Daures, personal
communication
French,
industrial
vessels
Revenue share and
guaranteed minimum
income
Costs are not
shared
Non-trip
related costs
not shared
Davidse et.al.
Dutch Cutter
Fisheries (85%
of the Dutch
fleet)
Revenue share
40%–45%
Cost share
40%–45%
Non-trip
related costs
not shared
Davidse et.al.
Dutch fisheries
covered by
collective
bargaining
Minimum wage plus
revenue share
Costs are not
shared
Non-trip
related costs
not shared
Davidse et.al. England, not
large vessels Revenue share Same as
revenue share
In principle
0%, but
gaining
ground
Davidse et.al. Scotland, not
large vessels
Revenue share equal
to 50%
Same as
revenue share
In principle
0%, but
gaining
ground on
small vessels
Davidse et.al.
England and
Scotland, large
vessels
Variable revenue share Costs are not
shared
Non-trip
related costs
not shared
The study of the practical arrangement of remuneration in fisheries as described thus far
can be summarized in the following way:  1.  Sharing is almost the universal form of
remuneration.  2.  Where remuneration is not governed by collective bargaining a variety of
contract forms exists.  Where remuneration is governed by collective bargaining rules are more
similar in form from fishery to fishery.  3.  Sometimes costs are shared and sometimes not.  It
seems that costs are not shared in fisheries where fishers are secured a guaranteed minimum
income.  4.  The most common form of cost sharing is that of sharing trip-related costs.  Repair9
costs are more likely to be shared on simpler, lesser sophisticated vessels.  Definition of
shareable costs may be influenced by the profitability of the particular fishery in question.
Explanations of the universality of sharing are offered in Zoeteveij (1956), Sutinen
(1979), Anderson (1982), Bergland (1995) and Matthiasson (1996).  These papers stress that
the share system offers incentives for the crew to work hard by linking effort and (expected)
income and yet save the crew from the risk exposure involved in full-fledged owner-
operation.8  The last paper points out that the production environment in fishing, where there
are direct links between effort and production, is a factor that favours sharing as remuneration
rather than other forms of remuneration.
Collective bargaining offers economies of scale in contracting in cases where contracts
must cover a multitude of vessel sizes, species caught, number of crews, types of gear.
Hence, the fact that contracts are more uniform under collective bargaining than under
decentralized bargaining is quite understandable.
Why should some fishermen share costs while others do not?  One obvious reason why
fishermen should share costs is to give the fishermen incentives to economize on the use of fuel
and other variable costs.    That argument obviously does not apply to all possible cases.
As to the fourth fact, Platteau and Nugent (1991) point out that cost sharing acts as a
dis-incentive to fishermen to misuse the vessel or other equipment.  This discouraging of the
mismanagement of assets comes in addition to the discouragement inherent in the fact that
improper use may reduce effective fishing time.  Platteau and Nugent explain the lower
frequency of maintenance cost sharing on sophisticated vessels by pointing out that the
probability of damage to vessel and/or nets depends to large extent on human skill, foresight
and coordination on labour-intensive vessels, but to a lesser extent on the modern,
sophisticated vessels.  They also mention that measurability of inputs and the possibility of
8 Zoeteweij (op.cit.) points out that the share system alleviates the risk that an absentee
owner is exposed to.10
asset-use over-reporting are important factors in determining whether costs are shared.
3 Theoretical considerations concerning cost sharing in the literature
Share cropping in agriculture has been widely studied [for a survey of some relevant
literature see Singh (1989)].  Sharing in fisheries has not been object of the same interest.
Noteworthy exceptions are Sutinen (1979), Anderson (1982) and Bergland (1994).  The
literature has mainly concentrated on the choice between sharing and other remuneration
arrangements. Sharing of expenditure as part of the share cropping arrangement has been
studied even less than sharing of revenue in fisheries.  Exceptions are Heady (1947), Adams
and Rask (1968) and Braverman and Stiglitz (1986), all of which study the matter in context of
agriculture.  In their models the income from and costs of an agricultural project are shared
between a land owner and a tenant.  Bergland (1994) concentrates on sharing in the context of
fisheries.  In his model the income from and costs of a fishing project are shared between a
vessel owner and his crew (or skipper).  Heady and Adams and Rask argue that inputs are
most efficiently used if the cost share and the revenue share are equal.9  Braverman and Stiglitz
and Bergland show that such an assumption only holds if agents are risk neutral and if the
(relative) size of the share parameters does not influence the willingness of the tenant (or the
skipper) to supply effort.  The relative sizes of the two share parameters depends on features of
9Adams and Rask note that a transition from a share contract where tenants pay for
inputs to, in their view the more economical, cost-sharing contract would enhance output and
increase the net income of tenants.  They argue that the case is less clear-cut from the point of
view of landlords.  Landlords will not only participate in paying for the extra inputs used due to
the more efficient payment system, they will also pay for the inputs that the tenant was using
under the previous, less efficient, payment scheme.  Hence, it would be possible that landlords
might lose more than they gained from applying the more incentive correct payment system.
Adams and Rask do not consider the possibility of adjusting the revenue share parameter along
with the cost share parameter in order to keep the landowner’s income unchanged.11
the farmers production and utility functions.  Other investigators have reasoned differently:
“Since the tenant chooses the project it is natural ... that the tenant incurs the cost of its
implementation.  In any case since the project choice cannot be monitored by the landlord, if he
paid for it, the tenant would take the money and choose the project which is most advantageous
from the tenant’s point of view.”  (Basu [1992], p. 208).  The same line of reasoning can be
extended to many other principal-agent relationships:  a carpenter mending the roof of a house
usually supplies his tools, they are not provided by the house-owner.  The divorce lawyer
usually uses his own computers and telephones and does not require his to-be-divorced
client(s) to supply them.  One obvious reason for this state of matters is the cost of surveillance
required to ensure that agents do not use principal supplied assets to their own benefit.  It
seems likely that for landlords to monitor whether fertilizers were used on shared land or on
plots that the tenants harvests privately would be far too costly.  In the case of the carpenter and
the divorce lawyer it is obviously more cost-effective for tools to be supplied by the agent than
by the principal.  Hence, both the theoretical literature and the practical examples supplied
above suggest that cost of inputs in principal-agent relationships is either shared or paid by the
agent.  The agent accrues the full cost of the inputs if he can supply inputs much more
efficiently than could the principal.  And the principal’s cost of monitoring the agent use of
inputs can be prohibitive.  Consequently, in order to understand the rational for the absence of
costs sharing in some fisheries it is necessary to investigate the nature of the production
relationship in fisheries.
4 The fishing trip production relationship and skipper strategies
Doll (1988) reviews the literature on economic modelling of fishing vessels.  He claims
that trip production functions have not been considered in detail in the literature (p. 106).
According to Doll, the fisherman is usually assumed to know the abundance of fish at given
locations with certainty.  Hence, it is assumed that if a trip is made, catch can be calculated with
certainty.12
Dupont (1993) develops a model to explain a vessel owners choice of location of port
of operation for a whole season.  In her model vessel owners choose port of operation on the
basis of expected profits and expected variability of profits.  Decisions regarding individual
trips are not a concern in Duponts model.
Palsson (1982) and Durrenberger and Palsson (1986) have studied behaviour of the
skippers of Sandger›i, Iceland during the 1981 fishing season.  They find that skipper choice
of fishing spot is not random:  “Most boats visit few locations and only a few locations are
visited by many boats.”  [See Durrenberger and Palsson (1986), p. 221].  Palsson (1982)
studies the behaviour of skippers after a period of no fishing activity, either due to non-fishing
intervals prescribed by the Ministry of Fishery or to foul weather.  He finds that during the first
day after the fishery is reopened vessels are scattered around.  The next day the vessels flock to
places where high per vessel catches were experienced the day before.  Moreover, catch per
vessel during the day is common knowledge at the end of the day.10  The fishing grounds that
a given vessel utilized during the day are not announced in the same manner, hence a skipper
puts considerable effort into surveillance of the movements of his fellow skippers.11
If all vessels flock to the same fishing place, that place will be overcrowded, with
subsequent “chaos of lines”, lost gear and reduced catches.  There are reports of fishers using
either informal or formal institutions to resolve such problems.  Acherson (1981, p. 281)
10A list of catch per vessel is typically posted in a conspicuous location by the Harbour
Office.  The Harbour Office registers all catches landed.
11Professor Páll Jensson at the University of Iceland Engineering Faculty has put some
effort into developing models of skipper decisions on trawlers.  In communication with the
author he reported that the trawler skippers in most cases do not conceal their whereabouts in
the same manner as do skippers on gill-net or long-line vessels.  Jensson also told the author
that trawler skippers tend to flock to a location where fish congregated at any given time.13
reports that sometimes fishing rights are allocated to the vessel that reaches the fishing ground
first, sometimes the fishing is organized in such a way that crews take turns in utilizing a given
(rich) fishing spot.12  There are even cases where governments control rights to fish a given
spot.13
Schlager (1994) examines 30 in-depth field studies of coastal fisheries around the
world.  She finds that sometimes fishing grounds are reserved for special equipment.  In other
cases fishers are required to harvest a given fishing spot in a given order or during given time
slots, “so that all fishers have equal opportunities of harvesting from the most productive spot
over the course of the year”.  One of the most ingenious arrangements she finds is in Alanya,
Turkey, where more than 15 fishermen compete for 15 productive spots.  The fishers have
developed a lottery and a rotation system to assign the best spots.
If a fishing ground is considered to be good it will attract many skippers.  Hence,
skippers will not be able to utilize the fishing ground at their discretion.  The expected catch per
vessel on a trip to an attractive fishing ground is hence determined by the formal and informal
12Páll Benediktsson, reporter for the Icelandic State Broadcasting Network visited
trawlers of many nationalities fishing red ocean perch [Sebastes marinus] on the Reykjanes
Ridge in early spring 1996, observed that the trawlers took turns fishing as fish congregated in
a very narrow space [personal communication and Benediktsson (1996)].
13Palsson (1987) reports that rules governing “rowing time” were set as early as 1901
in the Icelandic fishing settlement in the Westmann Islands (off the south coast of Iceland, close
to the spawning grounds of the Icelandic cod).  The Icelandic Parliament, Althingi, passed a
law that regulated rowing time in the fishing villages of the Su›urnes peninsula (including
Sandger›i) in 1946.  The ruling stated at what hour vessels from given harbours were allowed
to start a fishing trip, and thus giving all vessels “equal” opportunity to occupy the good fishing
places.14
rules that govern fishing-ground access.  As alluded to above, formal rules tend to stress
equality of access to the resource.14  Hence, if there are many vessels competing for relatively
few good fishing places one could anticipate that the expected catch per vessel per season
would be equalized (after making allowance for size differences, gear differences, weather
variability, etc.).
During a fishing season a skipper will make several trips to the fishing grounds.  Each
skipper will have to develop a strategy as to how to visit the various fishing spots within
reach.15  A skipper on a gill-net vessel may drop his nets all in one place and keep to that
location throughout the season.  Or he may drop nets in different locations.  He may develop a
rule for relocation of his nets based on movements of the fish and reports of the success of
other fishers.
14Rules are also in some cases used to eliminate unproductive competition as in the case
of the “rowing time” regulation in Iceland.  Such unproductive competition can be costly or
result in unstable outcomes or both.  In the case of the rowing time, there is obviously no
solution to a game where every skipper tries to start a trip earlier than his fellow skippers.
15Thorlindsson (1994) describes what he terms “skipper science”.  He identifies at least
three strategies (or tactics as he calls it).  The first strategy is to assume that the fish behaves in
the same way as last year.  A second strategy is to look at the behaviour of the fish some years
back and search for a pattern that suits to the present situation.  A third strategy is the strategy
of the catch-king skipper.  The catch king skipper does not assume that patterns are the same
from season to season.  He considers differences as well as similarities, using his throughout
knowledge of the previous seasons, using his own theory of how the fish behaves and
connects that to readings of environmental indicators and adapts the theory to the novelty of the
present situation.15
If we let F represent the catch of a skipper who drops his gear at random (follows a
“passive” strategy16), the size of F will be determined by the average quantity of fish and
average catchability of that fish for the given area.  Hence, F can be assumed to be constant.  If
we assume that skippers have access to a continuum of “active” strategies, successful “active”
strategy, M, will yield M–F tons of catch in excess of what a random drop of gear would
produce.  If the strategy is unsuccessful it will be as productive as the passive strategy, yielding
F tons of catch.17  Hence, expected catch from strategy M is given as:
E=p(M)[M–F] + F
or
16I have named the random strategy “passive” to reflect that it involves passive use of
information.  But it need not be passive in terms of sailing and putting out fishing gear.  In his
study of the behaviour of the Sandger›i skippers, Gisli Palsson observed that:  “... the skipper
... who fished in more locations than any other skipper failed.  He was hired to skipper a boat
owned by a processing plant and was fired at midseasong because he had not lived up to the
plant owner’s expectations.  He may have panicked at his early lack of success.”
[Durrenberger and Palsson (1986), p. 223].  This skipper may have started out with a strategy
that failed and fallen back on a random strategy using lot of time and energy to go from place to
place.
17Thorlindsson (1994, p. 331) reports:  “In herring fishing, for example, success
depends upon being where the herring surface.  Frequently a number of boats are close to a
shoal of herring, but only one of them will catch it.  Late-comers stand very little change of
catching anything.”  Hence, in the case of the herring fishery, F is almost zero.16
E=p(M)M + [1–p(M)]F (4.1)
Here p(M) is the probability that strategy M is successful.  It will be assumed that costs
associated with a strategy will increase as M increases.18
  Strategy M consists of successive trips to one or more fishing spots.  Each skipper will
have to choose among many possible strategies.  Each skipper knows that his fellow
competitors will have to choose between numerous strategies too.  Catch resulting from any
one fishing strategy depends on the availability and catchability of fish in the fishing spots
included in the strategy as well as the strategies’ pursued by all the other skippers.  Skippers do
not reveal their strategies for each other.19  Hence, a skipper can safely assume that his choice
of strategy will not influence other skippers choice of strategy.  The question is now, what will
be the expected catch associated with each strategy?  That will depend on the strategies chosen
by the other skippers.  Hence, we can think of the skippers as if they where playing a
coordination game.  Suppose there are many vessels and two fishing strategies.  Should a
skipper follow strategy a or strategy b?  A skipper knows that if all other skippers follow
strategy a he is best off following strategy b and vica versa.  He knows that all other skippers
are as knowledable as he is.  Hence, he is not likely to be able to gain knowledge of the choices
of the others by introspection.  Consequently, he must assume that the other skippers choose
strategies randomly.  But if the skipper believes that all other skippers mix their strategies he is
18One reason might be that waiting time at sea is longer.  Another reason could be that
more locations would be visited during a given trip.
19Skippers do not even reveal their strategies to their own crew-members.  And the
crew-members may have hard time figuring out the strategy of the skipper:  “...One of Binni’s
[Binni was a famous catch king] former crewmen remarked in an interview with the author that
only after having worked on his boat for several seasons did he begin to detect a pattern in the
skipper’s fishing tactics”, Palsson (1991, p. 118), italics added by the author of this paper.17
best off by also mixing his strategies.20  On the condition that all skippers have the same
information, and that they are all equally able and that they all expect others choice of strategy
to be unaffected by their own choice, expected catch will be equalized between strategies.21  To
see this, consider the opposite, that catch is not equalized across strategies.  Assume, for the
sake of argument that strategy z is better than any other strategy.  Then, a skipper would be
able to increase expected catch of his vessel by choosing the strategy with higher probability
than other strategies.  But, if this enhanced the well-being of one skipper, a similar move
20Skippers may use different methods to randomize their choice.  Some claim to follow
signs given in dreams, or some strange message, “...a whisper”, see Pálsson (1991, p. 118).
21Assume that there are only two fishing spots available.  Strategies will involve a visit
to each spot with a given probability.  Denote average catch in spot a as A aand average catch in
spot b as Ab.  Assume that average catch in each spot is given as Ai =Xi/ni where Xi is a
measure of catchable fish in spot i at a given period of time, while ni is the number of vessels
visiting that spot during that period.  Assume further that total number of vessels is N.  Then a
skipper that believes that other skippers mix strategies would do best by visiting spot a by the
probability:
p =   
n 
2 
a X b 
n 
2 
a X b +    n 
2 
b X a 
  =   
n 
2 
a X b 
n 
2 
a X b +    N - n  a 
2 X a 
   (*)
If all skippers mix strategies n  a   =  pN.  Together with (*) that would yield that average catch
per vessel in either location would be equal to   
X a + X b 
N  . 18
would enhance the well-being of other skippers.  Hence, strategy z would be followed more
often than other strategies.  Furthermore, fishing spots that strategy z prescribed visited would
attract more vessels than “equally rich” fishing spots only prescribed by other strategies.  But,
by earlier assumptions, when a fishing spot is overcrowded, catch in that fishing spot declines.
Hence, expected catch accruing to vessels of skippers following strategy z would eventually
decline.  The decline of expected catch associated with strategy z, would not come to halt until
expected catch associated with strategy z was equal to expected catch from any other strategy.
Consequently, it may be concluded that equilibrium in choice of strategies involves equalization
of catch across strategies.
It should however, be kept in mind that although expected catch is fixed across
strategies, the probability for the success of strategies differs.  Thus, high M is associated with
concentration of trips to a series of fishing spots where a lucky skipper might get a very good
catch.  But of cause the rich fishing spots will attract many vessels, making access more
difficult than if less attractive fishing spots were visited.  Hence, the first derivative of the p(M)
function, denoted as  p’(M), is negative.
5 Skipper and vessel owner interactions
Let us suppose that a vessel owner has decided to remunerate his skipper by shares.
He has yet to decide the size of the cost- and revenue-share parameters.  The vessel owner
knows that his choice of share parameters will influence the skipper’s choice of strategy.
The pecuniary-shareable-costs of following a strategy are represented by the cost
function, C(M).  Gear-, fuel- and ice-expenses are examples of such costs.  Further skipper-
specific, non-shareable-costs, are represented by the function S(M).  The (implicit) cost of
skipper time spent on information gathering and digestion is an example of skipper-specific
costs.  Both types of costs are independent of whether the strategy is a “failure” or a19
“success”.22  It will be assumed that C’(M)>0, S’(M)>0 and that C’’(M)>0, S’’(M)>0.  If the
vessel stays in harbour (so that no project is carried out) then C(0)=S(0)=0.
The skipper is remunerated by a share in the revenue less a (different) share of the
costs.  Let us assume that the vessel owner is restricted by a minimum wage rule.  Such a rule
might, for example, be the result of collective bargaining between organizations of employers
and employees.  Hence, if skipper income generated by the share system fails to meet the
minimum B the vessel owner must, according to the general rule just mentioned, pay the
minimum wage and ignore the provisions of the share agreement.
Now, as skipper strategies can be either successes or a failures three possibilities must
be considered:  i)  Catch can be high enough in both states to avoid the use of the minimum
wage rule.  Then the skipper receives a share of the revenue and contributes a share of costs in
both states.  ii)  Catch can be so low in both states that the use of the minimum wage is
required.  iii)  The successful state is good enough to trigger the use of the share rule, while the
failure state triggers the payment of the flat wage.  Situation i) resembles the set-up that is
usually analyzed in the share-cropping literature.  Income is totally governed by the share
agreement.23  Situation ii) resembles the situation of fixed wage and the skipper faces the so-
called moral hazard dilemma.  Both situations have been widely analyzed.  The following
section will focus on case iii).  Here, if catch is good, the skipper will earn 
22 A skipper on a gill-net vessel, for instance, must visit all his nets regularly.  A long-
line vessel skipper must have his gear towed up and rebaited regularly, regardless of the
quantity of the catch, as bait is either “stolen” (by non-commercial species) or loses its
attractiveness in time.  Furthermore, the cost of trawling does not depend to any considerable
extent on the volume of catch in the trawl.
23This case can be analyzed in the present model by observing the requirement that
0£p(M)£1.20
M- C M - S M , if catch is bad he will earn B–S(M).  In this case   and   are the
respective revenue and cost shares facing the skipper.  B is the income transferred from the
vessel owner to the skipper in case of a failure. 
Expected income of a skipper can be written as:
Z  S  ,  , M    =    1 - p  M  B + p  M  M -  C  M  - S  M  (5.1)
The skipper will choose M, so as to ensure that (5.1) is maximized.  The skipper’s choice of
fishing strategy will hinge on the values of the share parameters.  Thus,
M , = Argmax
M
ZS , ,M (5.2)
Now, we can use (4.1), the definition of expected catch associated with any given strategy and
the assumption that catch in case of failure, F,  is constant and the result that expected catch
associated with any possible strategy is E, to write:
p M  =  
E- F
M- F (5.3)
Thus, the higher M is the lower is the probability that M is a success, as suggested above.
The first-order condition associated with (5.2) [using (5.1) and (5.3)] is given as:
E- F B - F- M- F CN M + C M - M- F
2S N M = 0 (5.4)
To interpret (5.4), add and subtract  M E  -  F , and divide through with (M–F)2, and observe
that  
M  p 
M  M    =     -    
E  -  F 
M  -  F 
2  .  Then,  (5.4) can be written as:21
p  + 
M  p 
M  M  M -  C  M  - B    =  S N M  + p  C N M  (5.5)
The left hand side of (5.5) represents expected increase in income accruing to the skipper due to
increase in M by one unit.  This gain is influenced by the expected increase in output and the
effect that changed strategy has on the probability that the chosen strategy is successful.  The
cost is influenced by increase in skipper non-shareable costs and expected increase in the
burden of shared costs.
Note that (5.4) can not be fulfilled unless:
B >  F -  C  M  (5.6)
This requirement implies that the income guarantee must really enhance skipper income in case
of failure.
Fulfillment of the second-order condition associated with (5.2) requires that:
 =   E- F CO M + 2S N M + M- F S O M > 0 (5.7)
The requirement (5.7) is fulfilled due to the assumptions regarding the first and second
derivatives of the cost functions and the fact that M³E³F (with at least one of the inequalities
effective at each time) while   is non-negative.  Hence, given the restriction listed in (5.6) the
existence of a strategy, M, that solves the problem of the skipper is ensured.
Comapartive static results
Differentiating (5.4) with respect to B yields:
M  M 
M  B       =      
-  E - F 
-  M - F    =      
E - F 
M - F    >    0  (5.8)22
Hence, skippers will react to increase in the guaranteed base wage by choosing a higher
yielding, more demanding and more risky strategy.  Increasing B reduces the loss incurred in
case of failure.  The (marginal) gain involved in aiming at a somewhat higher M will be bigger
than the (marginal) cost of doing so.  More specifically, the effect of increasing B can be traced
to two effects that I will term the income effect and the probability effect.  The income effect
[which, in the above expression is represented by the term –(E–F)] comes around as increase in
B increases skipper income and enables him to “buy” more inputs to support a higher M.  The
probability effect [which, in the above expression may be represented by the term –1/{(M–F)D
}] comes around as increase in M increases the probability that the (now a bit better) “bad” state
is realized.  Both effects are negative, but as a change in probability is involved they interact in
a multiplicative manner, yielding a positive relationship between M and B.
Furthermore, we find that:
M  M 
M    =    M  ,    =   -   
E - F  F 
M - F    <    0  (5.9)
Hence, a increase in the revenue share parameter induces the skipper to engage in
strategies that yield lower catch than before.  Increasing the revenue share increases the loss
that the skipper experiences in case of a failed strategy.  The marginal cost of the chosen
strategy must be lowered.  The only way to do that is by aiming at a lower M.  Again there are
two effects at work.  Consider first the income effect, represented by the term  (E–F)F.  An
increase in the revenue share reduces the gain that the skipper gets from the base wage
guarantee.  Hence, as the base wage is worth less he reduces the amount of inputs that he buys.
Secondly, consider the probability effect, represented as before by the “multiplicator”
–1/{(M–F)D } .  If the revenue share term is increased, then the base wage becomes lesser
worth so the skipper will try harder to avoid the “bad” state.  He can reduce the probability that
the “bad” state is to be realized by reducing M.  The probability effect is negative and23
multiplicative.  The income effect is positive.  The overall effect is therefore a negative
relationship between the revenue share and the  yield of the chosen strategy in the “good” state.
Lastly, we find that:
M  M 
M    =    M  ,    =      
E - F  M - F 
C  M 
M  -   
M 
M - F   +   
C N M  M 
C  M 
-  M - F     (5.10)
The sign of M   will depend on the size of elasticity of shareable costs with respect to
choice of strategy and the ratio of catch in the “good” state relative of catch in the “bad” size in
the following way:
   M  ,    #     0   iff         
C N M  M 
C  M    $    
M 
M - F  (5.11)
Now, we know that the cost elasticity is bigger than one.  Hence, C’(M)M/C(M)>1.
Consequently, M  must be negative for small F’s or when M is large relatively to F.
Furthermore, the bigger is M the more likely is it that skippers will react to a increase in the cost
share parameter by reducing M.  An one-sided increase in the costshare reduces the loss that the
skipper would experience in case of a failed strategy.  Was this the only effect at work the
skipper would pursue a strategy involving a higher M.  But increasing the cost share will also
increase the cost of using inputs, so the unit cost of M so to speak, is now higher.  Again, was
this the only effect at work the skipper would pursue a strategy involving lower M.  Equation
(5.11) reveals that the second effect is stronger when the cost elasticity is bigger than the ratio
of  M to (M–F).24
The problem of a vessel owner
For a given set of share parameters and the skipper’s choice of fishing spot the expected
net income of a vessel owner is given as:
Z BO , ,M
= 1-p M F-B-C M +p M 1- M- 1- C M (5.12)
The problem of the vessel owner is:
Max
,
 ZBO , ,M  s.t.  i  M= M ,  and  ii ZS³Z
*
S
The first constraint is to take into account that the skipper’s choice of fishing spot is influenced
by the choice of share parameters, while the second constraint takes into account that the
skipper must be guaranteed an expected income from fishing that is no less than the expected
income in alternative employment if he is to be induced to engage in the fishing enterprise.
If we let 
*,
*
 be the solution to the vessel owner’s problem, and denote other
equilibrium values with a star, we are ready to establish the following proposition:
Proposition 1: As long as S(M)>0 and B>0, and as long as (5.6)holds, the vessel
owner maximizes his profits by paying all costs himself  = 0  rather
than sharing costs with the skipper.
Proof:24 The proof proceeds as follows:  an optimally designed contract is
offered.  Then it is assumed that the cost share according to that contract
24The proof is inspired by Basu (1992).25
is positive.  Could the vessel owner improve that contract by reducing
the cost share to zero?  If the answer is yes, then the assumptions of a
positive cost share parameter must be modified.
Suppose 
*,
*
 is an equilibrium contract.  Assume that
0<
* < 1 and 0<
* < 1.  In such case:
N  =  
*  -  
* C M
*
M
*
N  =   0
(5.13)
Here M
* = Argmax
M
Z S
*,
*,M .
Now, if the skipper is to accept the changed contract it must satisfy the
skipper’s participation constraint.  Hence, we must investigate if:
Z S N, N,MN ³Z
*
S (5.14)
Where M N  = Argmax
M 
Z  S  N  ,  N  , M 
From the definition of M’ we know that the skipper can not improve his
position by choosing a different project, hence:
Z S N, N,MN ³ZS N, N,M
In particular, we have that:26
ZS N, N,MN ³ZS N, N,M
*
Hence by use of the definition of ZS:
Z S N, N,MN ³Z S N, N,M
*
= p M
* * -
* C
*
M
* M
* + 1- p M
* B - S M
*
= Z S
*,
*,M
* ³Z
*
S
which establishes (5.14).  Hence, the changed contract does not violate
the skipper’s participation constraint.
If the changed contract is to be superior to the original contract from the
vessel owner’s point of view the following must be true:
ZBO N, N,MN  ³ ZBO
*,
*,M
* (5.15)
To find out the effect of changing the contact we have to establish how
the skipper reacts to changes in the revenue and cost share parameters.
First we totally differentiate  M
* = M
*,
* [cf. (5.2)]  with respect to
,   and M taking into account that a change in the revenue share will
trigger a change in the cost share:
M - F  - 1 
M  M 
M  +  M - F  - 1 
M  M 
M  A 
M 
M 27
+ E- F - F -   M- F CN M
M
M  +   C M
M
M  =  0
Here D is given by (5.7).  The changed contract stipulated in (5.13)
implies that d
* =  
C
*
M
* d
*.  Inserted in the above expression and
simplified this yields:
d  M 
d  d  * =  C  * 
M  * 
d  *   =   
E - F 
1    -   
C N M 
C  M  M    <    0  (5.16)
The sign of the derivative in (5.16) follows from our assumptions that
C’() > 0, C’’() > 0 and C(0) = 0 which implies that 
CN M
C M /M > 1.
Hence, as  N= 0 which implies    N<
*, then [by (5.13) and (5.16)]: 
M*<M’ (5.17)
If we assume that the changed contract improves vessel-owner profit so
that (5.15) is true, then:
pN 1- N MN+ 1- pN F- B - C MN
> p
* 1-
* M
* - 1-
* C M
*
+ 1- p
* F- B - C M
* (5.18)28
Inserting elements of  (5.13) in (5.18) and simplifying yields:
1- N pNMN- p
*M
* > F- B pN- p
* - C M
* - C MN
(5.19)
Utilizing (5.3) we can write:
p N  M N  - p * M *   =   
E - F  F  M * - M N 
M N  - F  M * - F   
and:
p N  - p *   =   
E - F  M * - M N 
M * - F  M N  - F 
Inserting in (5.19) and simplifying yields:
E- F F M
* - MN
M
* - F MN- F
1- N
> F- B
M
* - MN
M
* - F MN- F
 -   C M
* - C MN (5.20)
Multiplying with 
M * - F  M N  - F 
E - F  M * - M N  yields:
1 -  N F >  F - B    -   
M 
* - F  M N  - F 
M 
* - M N  E - F 
C  M 
*  - C  M N  (5.21)29
Further simplification yields:
B -  N  F >   -   
M 
* - F  M N  - F 
M 
* - M N  E - F 
C  M 
*  - C  M N  (5.22)
In (5.6) we ruled out all contracts excepts those that fulfilled the
requirement thatB  >    F -  C  M  .  This must therefore also hold for
the apostrophe marked contract.  Hence, B  >    N  F .  The expression
M 
* - F  M N  - F 
M 
* - M N  E - F 
C  M 
*  - C  M N   is positive as M*<M’ and
C(M*)<C(M’).  Hence (5.22) is true as the entity on the left hand side
of the inequality sign is positive and the entity on the right hand side is
negative.  But (5.22) is deduced from (5.15)  so (5.15) must also be
true.  But (5.15) stated that the apostrophe marked contract is better than
the star marked contract.  Hence we can conclude that the starred
contract can be replaced by another contract (the apostrophe marked
contract) which will yield results as good or better to the vessel owner as
the starred contract did.  Hence, (5.22) contradicts the initial assumption
that the star marked contract was as good or better than any other
contract that could be designed. QED
The comparative statics results reported above showed that a reduction in the revenue
share would induce the skipper to choose a more risky strategy, a higher M.  The comparative
statics results also showed that skipper reaction to a reduction in the cost share parameter would
be ambigous.   Proposition 1 shows that a simultaneous change in the two parameters that is30
designed so as to leave pecuniary skipper income unchanged will induce the skipper,
unambiguously, to choose a more risky and more demanding strategy.
The results above hinges crucially on two aspects of the situation.  Firstly, the existence
of a guaranteed base wage, B, that is sufficiently high so that (5.6) is fulfilled.  In light of
proposition 1, this requirement implies that the base wage must be higher than the skipper
revenue share if the chosen strategy fails.  
The second aspect that is crucial for the our result is the existence of strategy-dependent
skipper-specific costs.  The existence of strategy-dependent skipper-specific costs introduces a
wedge between the interests of the skipper and the vessel owner.  The vessel owner would
presumably want the skipper to pursue more daring strategies than what the skipper finds
optimal.  Our comparative static results show that the existence of a guaranteed base wage
induces the skipper to engage in higher “good” state yield strategies than he would do in the
absence of such a guarantee.  But Proposition 1 shows that the vessel owner is better off if he
uses the instruments at hand to induce the skipper to engage in still more daring strategies.
That he can do by simultaneously lowering both share parameters.
6 Conclusion
The fundamental question that we started with was: Why do Icelandic vessel owners
pay all costs of operation of their vessels when vessel owners in many other countries share
such costs with their crews?
According to the model presented in this paper, the base wage and the zero cost share
are both likely to coexist in fisheries where strategy-dependent skipper-specific costs are
important.  It is not so that the one causes the other, but rather so that both are caused by the
specific situation of skipper-specific costs.  Now, skipper specific costs are by definition non-
sharable.  In most cases they are also non-observable.  Hence, the covariance of skipper
specific costs and zero cost sharing will not lend it self testable.  But the model predicts a
positive covariation of skipper-specific costs, a guaranteed base wage and zero cost sharing. 31
The covariation of a guaranteed base wage and zero cost sharing seems to fit well with facts.
In fisheries where a base wage is guaranteed the general rule is that costs are not shared.  This
is the case in the Icelandic fisheries, in the menhaden fishery in the US, and in parts of the
Danish, Dutch and English fisheries.  The same tendency of reduced cost sharing in the
presence of a guaranteed base wage can also be traced in the Norwegian fisheries.  More data
gathering is necessary, however, to establish how and to what extent costs are strategy-
dependent in those fisheries.
The guaranteed base wage, B, is modelled as if exogenously given.  Base wage
guarantees are either negotiated between organizations of employers and employees or
stipulated by an act of law.  The spirit of the model presented is that introduction of a
guaranteed base wage need not be very harmful to vessel owners and beneficial to skippers.
The introduction of a positive base wage would induce a skipper faced with strategy-dependent
skipper-specific costs to engage in more daring strategies and hence induce him to spend some
more of his own resources than he would otherwise have been willing to do.  Vessel owners in
fisheries where skipper specific costs are, or could be important, that offer a base wage and a
zero cost share might do better than vessel owners that offer other forms of remuneration.
Note that, according to the model, vessel owners go as far as possible in order to
induce skippers to take more risky strategy.  Or in other words, the vessel owners behave as if
they were risk-loving, while skippers behave as if risk averse, even thought both agents are
modelled as risk neutral. This is contrary to the findings of Basu (1992).  The sharecroppers in
his model and the skipper in the present model are in similar position.  The same is true for
landowners in his model and vessel owners in the present model.  Sharecroppers in Basu’s
model behave as if risk lovers while the landowners behave as if risk-averse, but both are
modelled as if risk neutral.  The reason for different conclusions has to do with different
assumptions regarding institutions and the production environment.  Basu’s sharecroppers pay
all costs implied by the strategy chosen, and he assumes that agricultural costs are not strategy-
dependent.  In the fishery context I find it natural to take a different approach and assume that
costs are strategy-dependent.  Dupont (1993) finds that some Canadian salmonskippers/vessel32
owners seem to be risk lovers while others seem to be risk averse with respect to choice of
location for their operations in a given season.  In the light of the present model and the model
of Basu, such conclusion should not come as a surprise.  It is possible that her findings reflect
differences in institutional arrangements and/or differences with respect to the production
process.
The sparse evidence presented in Table 1 indicates that cost sharing is more widespread
in traditional fisheries than in technologically more advanced fisheries.  This would be
consistent with the present model if skippers’ choices of strategies in the traditional case had
little influence on revenue and costs, while having significant consequences in the advanced
fisheries.
Costs may be shared in fisheries where the assumptions for proposition 1 are not
fulfilled.  Hence we are likely to find cost sharing in fisheries where choice of fishing strategy
does not affect costs, and where skipper-specific costs are insignificant, or where choice of
strategy does not affect vessel-owner income and/or skipper income in a significant manner.
The basic lesson from the exercise presented in this paper is that it need not be totally
uneconomical when principals pay all costs incurred by an agent.  Given certain institutional
and productive arrangements the costs saved by the principal by using a cost-sharing rule might
be less than income gained by not using that rule.
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